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Abstract Bullard (1994) and Scho¨nhofer (1999) show that endogenous business
cycles may emerge in an inflationary overlapping generations model where house-
holds predict future inflation rates by running a least squares regression on prices.
We show that given the same beliefs but under an alternative, more natural, estima-
tion procedure based upon inflation rates the monetary steady state will be globally
stable for a large set of savings functions. We also study an evolutionary competi-
tion between the two estimation procedures. Although the dynamics are stabilized
for a large set of parameter values, endogenous business cycles may still emerge
in this heterogeneous beliefs framework.
Keywords Overlapping generations models · Learning · Endogenous business
cycles · Heterogeneous beliefs · Evolutionary dynamics
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1 Introduction
There is a growing literature pointing out the limitations of the rational expectations
hypothesis. In particular, it has been perceived as unsatisfactory that this hypoth-
esis endows economic agents with precise information about the structure of the
economy and the beliefs of other agents as well as unbounded reasoning abilities
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to deal with this information. A number of authors have suggested that the rational
expectations hypothesis still is valid as a description of long run behavior, since
economic agents learn over time and eventually arrive at a rational expectations
steady state. The rational expectations hypothesis can therefore be supported by a
learning story (see Lucas 1986; Marcet and Sargent 1989; Evans and Honkapohja
2001). In such a learning model boundedly rational agents are generally assumed
to have no structural information about their economic environment other than
time series observations on certain economic variables. They use these observa-
tions to make inferences about the economic environment. In his book on bounded
rationality Sargent (1993, p. 22) writes: “We can interpret the idea of bounded
rationality broadly as a research program to build models populated by agents who
behave like working economists or econometricians.” Since the perceptions of
agents influence their behavior, the learning feeds back into the actual realizations
of economic variables. Hence, the learning procedure itself is one of the deter-
minants of the evolution of the economic variables. With respect to this learning
procedure Bullard (1994, p. 468) states:
“A common research question, asked increasingly often in the recent litera-
ture, is how this learning takes place, and more importantly, if it makes any
difference for inferences from dynamic general equilibrium models whether
the learning is explicitly modeled.”
In this paper Bullard (1994) shows, in an overlapping generations framework,
that modelling agents explicitly as econometricians might create equilibrium paths
that do not converge to the rational expectations steady state. Some of these learn-
ing equilibria can be characterized by endogenous fluctuations in inflation rates and
agents beliefs. Moreover, Scho¨nhofer (1999) shows that chaotic learning equilibria
exist.
The objective of the present paper is twofold. First, we show that the non-
convergence results of Bullard (1994) and Scho¨nhofer (1999) depend heavily on
the estimation procedure their agents use. The net effect of their procedure is that
agents weight their past observations with an exponentially (over time) decreasing
factor. In other words, their agents forget quickly. But then it is not surprising that
the rational expectations steady state may not be learned. In fact, we will show that
for an estimation procedure that seems to be more natural from a statistical point
of view, the steady state of the learning model is globally stable for a large set
of savings functions (including those studied by Bullard 1994; Scho¨nhofer 1999).
An important observation is that the perceived law of motion is the same for both
procedures, the only difference is in the way this perceived law is estimated. The
main point is that it might be more appropriate from an econometric point of view
to run a regression on a stationary time series rather than on a nonstationary time
series. The fact that in the presented model agents want to predict the inflation
rates, together with the observation that the time series of price levels is nonsta-
tionary, suggests that the estimation procedure should be in terms of inflation rates
instead of price levels. Indeed, we prove that for an estimation procedure based
upon inflation rates the monetary steady state is globally stable for a large set of
savings functions. The learning equilibria are therefore driven by the estimation
procedure agents use and not by the fact that they are learning nor by the structure
of their beliefs.
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In this paper we identify a different source of complicated dynamics in this infla-
tionary overlapping generations framework. We are interested whether all house-
holds will persistently use estimation procedures that do not lead to consistent and
converging estimates. Therefore, the second objective of our paper is to study an
environment where both types of estimation procedures are available to the house-
holds, and where they choose one of them on the basis of their past performance
(with past performance being measured in terms of forecasting accuracy). The main
research question then is whether the estimation procedure suggested by Bullard
(1994) and Scho¨nhofer (1999) will still be viable when a more natural procedure
is available, or whether the latter will drive out the former. We investigate this
issue by employing the Brock and Hommes (1997) model of evolutionary compe-
tition between heterogeneous beliefs. Contrary to our initial expectations, we find
that both rules survive this evolutionary competition and that endogenous business
cycles are still possible in this heterogenous beliefs framework, albeit for a sig-
nificantly smaller set of overlapping generation economies. The intuition behind
this result is that, far away from the steady state, the “stable” estimation procedure
will perform better (in terms of forecast errors) and eventually most households
of future generations will use this rule, which will stabilize the inflation rates.
However, for inflation rates close to the steady state, evolutionary pressure against
the “unstable” estimation procedure will diminish and more households of future
generations will start using it, which may destabilize the inflation dynamics. After
this the whole story repeats.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the overlapping gener-
ations model and the learning equilibria studied in Bullard (1994). In Section 3
the main stability results for the alternative estimation procedure are given. Sec-
tion 4 introduces evolutionary competition between the two different estimation
procedures and Section 5 concludes.
2 Learning equilibria
We consider a standard two period overlapping generations model with only one
commodity, where in each period a generation is born that lives for two periods.
The generation born in period t solves
max
c0,c1
U (c0, c1) subject to ptc0 + pet+1c1 ≤ ptw0 + pet+1w1, (1)
where U : IR2+ → IR is a strictly monotone, strictly quasi concave utility function,
c0 (w0) and c1 (w1) are consumption (endowment) of the commodity in the first and
second period of the agent’s life, pt is the price of the commodity in period t and
pet+1 the price expected for period t + 1. Optimal saving of the young generation















solves (1). From now on we will assume that the savings function is twice differ-
entiable and positive, i.e. S (ξ) > 0 for all ξ .1 The demand for real balances in
1 Any continuous function corresponds to a savings function (which is an aggregate excess
demand function) consistent with utility maximization, if we extend the number of different
agents per generation to at least two (see Sonnenschein, 1973).
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The only means of saving is money. The money stock Mt is controlled by the gov-
ernment and grows over time to finance government expenditures. The monetary
policy rule is
Mt = ϑMt−1. (3)
Combining the demand for real balances (2) with the monetary policy rule (3),





) = ϑS (πet−1
)
. (4)
At the monetary steady state, π∗ = ϑ , the inflation rate is equal to the money
growth rate.
The model is closed by specifying the way in which agents form expectations
about future inflation rates. Under rational expectations or perfect foresight we
have πet+1 = πt+1. It is well-known that for a downward sloping savings function
the monetary steady state ϑ is unstable under perfect foresight. In this case the
steady state is also said to be locally determinate, i.e. it is the locally unique perfect
foresight solution. For non-monotonic savings functions more complicated perfect
foresight dynamics, such as cycles and chaotic fluctuations, may occur (see e.g.
Grandmont 1985).
The assumption of perfect foresight requires that agents exactly know the mar-
ket equilibrium equations as well as other agents’ beliefs and are able to use this
information to compute the market clearing prices for the future. An alternative
approach is to assume that economic agents make inferences about their environ-
ment by means of a learning procedure. Such a procedure uses time series obser-
vations to make forecasts about the future development of variables. Consider for
example the case where agents believe that the inflation rate is constant, that is, in
terms of prices, they have the following perceived law of motion
pt = βpt−1. (5)
The agents have no a priori knowledge about β, however. Bullard (1994) assumes
that agents run a least squares regression on prices in order to estimate β and that
they use this estimate to form predictions on the inflation rate. The least squares









and hence their forecast of the inflation rate is πet = βt . Given this forecast, the
implied actual law of motion for the price dynamics of the model becomes
pt = ϑ S (βt−1)
S (βt )
pt−1. (7)
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Equations (6) and (7) together form an expectations feedback system. Realized
prices influence how agents perceive their economic environment and these per-
ceptions feed back into the actual dynamics and determine which prices will be






and γt ≡ βt−1
equations (6) and (7) can be written as




















Define the inflation elasticity of savings as a (π) = −π S ′(π)
S(π)
. We then have
Proposition 1 (Bullard 1994) Assume ϑ > 1 and S (.) is twice differentiable and
downward sloping. Then (8) generically undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at the mon-
etary steady state at that value ϑ∗ of ϑ , for which
(
1 − ϑ−2) a (ϑ) = 1. (9)
Moreover, if (1 − ϑ−2) a (ϑ) < (>) 1 the monetary steady state is locally stable
(unstable).
It will be useful for us to investigate the details of this result a little further.
The Jacobian matrix of (8) evaluated at the monetary steady state (β∗, γ ∗, g∗) =(













One of the eigenvalues is equal to ϑ−2 and hence lies inside the unit circle for
ϑ > 1. The other two eigenvalues are complex and lie on the unit circle when(
1 − ϑ−2) a (ϑ) = 1. Moreover, the eigenvalues cross the unit circle with positive
speed as ϑ changes. The Hopf bifurcation described in the proposition leads to
an invariant closed curve around the steady state of the learning dynamics. This
closed curve can be attracting or repelling, and motion on the closed curve can be
periodic or quasi-periodic.2,3 Bullard (1994) calls these cycles “learning equilib-
ria” since they correspond to equilibria of the learning dynamics, which are not
equilibria under rational expectations. Their existence can therefore be attributed
2 Quasi-periodic motion on a circle is obtained if, measuring the position on the circle by
an angle ζ , the dynamics are given as ζt+1 = ζt + 2πκ , where κ is not a rational number.
Then the iterates ζt are all distinct from each other, and it can be shown that they fill the circle
densely. Invariant quasi-periodic circles are surprisingly stable under perturbations. For details,
see Arnol’d (1983) or Devaney (1989).
3 If the savings function is nonmonotonic similar phenomena occur. In that case, the monetary
steady state may also lose stability through a period-doubling bifurcation. This happens at that
value ϑ∗ of ϑ for which ϑ2−1
ϑ2+1a (ϑ) = − 12 .
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to the learning process. If ϑ is increased further, the time series of the inflation rates
can become even more complicated. Scho¨nhofer (1999) gives, for some specific
examples, numerical evidence for the existence of homoclinic orbits and chaos in
the learning dynamics.
Let us now try to understand why the recursive least squares estimates do
not converge to the monetary steady state. Ordinary least squares algorithms are
so-called decreasing gains algorithms. Different observations receive the same
weights in the regression which implies that, as time goes on and the number of
observations increases, the impact or gain of individual new observations becomes





price levels are bounded gt will converge to 0 which, if it does not result in con-
vergence to the monetary steady state, at least leads to ever smaller changes in the
estimate of β. In the present model, however, price levels are unbounded and in
fact grow at a constant rate ϑ > 1 at the steady state, leading to a strictly positive
equilibrium value of gt , g∗ = 1 − ϑ−2 > 0. Hence, even after many observations,
one new observation on the price level may lead to a significant change in the
beliefs of the agents, which therefore may keep on fluctuating, implying endog-
enous and persisting fluctuations in the inflation rates. All observations still get
the same weight in the regression, but the fact that these observations themselves
become larger prevent the gain from converging to 0.
In fact, least squares learning on price levels is closely related to the adaptive
expectations rule on inflation rates. Adaptive expectations (Nerlove 1958) cor-
respond to updating the expectation in the direction of the last observation, i.e.,




, with 0 < α ≤ 1. Notice that the weight α is constant,
and adaptive expectations therefore correspond to a constant gains algorithm. Intro-
ducing adaptive expectations into (4) yields the following second order difference
equation








Notice that the only difference between (8) and (11) is that for the latter the weight
α is constant whereas for the former it depends upon the realization of the prices.
However, if the weight in (11) equals α = g∗ = 1 − ϑ−2, (11) has the same local
stability properties as (8).4 Hence, the learning scheme proposed by Bullard (1994)
turns out to be closely related to adaptive expectations. Although the weight or gain
gt in (8) is not constant, it is certainly not (monotonically) decreasing over time.
The residuals or forecast errors from the regression (6) turn out to be








Recall the concept of ω-limit set ω (x0) of a point x0 in a dynamical system . This
is the ‘asymptotic tail’of the orbit through x0, that is, the set of accumulation points
of the orbit of throughx0; in symbolsω (x0) =
⋂
t>0
{y|y = s (x0) , s > t},where
the upper bar indicates closure of the set. We now have
4 This follows from the fact that the upper 2 × 2 matrix of (10) (which is the relevant part) is
equal to the Jacobian of (11) evaluated at the monetary steady state.
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Lemma 2 Consider the dynamical system (8) for ϑ > 1. If the economy evolves
along an ω-limit evolution other than the monetary steady state ϑ and if the βt
remain bounded for all t , then the forecast errors (12) grow without bound.
Proof Note that the implied actual law (7) yields
pt+n = ϑn S(βt )
S(βt+n)
pt . (13)
By assumption, there is a constant M > 0 such that 0 < βt < M for all t . Let




p0 ≤ ptϑ−t ≤ m2
m1
p0.
We see that the prices pt grow exponentially, asymptotically with rate ϑ . Therefore,
if forecast errors are bounded, then from (12) we have limt→∞ ϑ S(βt−1)S(βt ) −βt−1 = 0.
For an evolution on anω-limit set, the limit is attained already, andϑ S(βt−1)
S(βt )
−βt−1 =
0, for all t . But then the learning model (8) implies that βt+1 = βt for all t , and
consequently, that βt = ϑ , contrary to the assumption that the dynamics is not at
the monetary steady state. unionsq
This lemma provides us with another explanation for the nonconvergence of
the recursive system (8): because the forecast errors grow indefinitely (in absolute
value), the estimates keep changing significantly, despite the fact that the weight
attached to each individual observation in the least squares regression (6) decreases
as time goes by. Each new observation can upset the current estimate and lead to
a radical change in the estimated perceived law of motion which, of course, is an
unsatisfactory property of an estimation procedure. Given the exploding forecast
errors, and the fluctuations in the beliefs, agents will be inclined to change their
estimation procedure.
In sum, it is the fact that agents use a nonstationary time series for their regres-
sion that drives the possible instability of the learning process.Whether it is, from an
econometrician’s viewpoint, sensible to use this nonstationary time series depends
upon how stochastic shocks enter the perceived law of motion. That is, if agents
believe that the evolution of prices is governed by pt = βpt−1+εt where εt is white
noise, a least squares regression might in fact be appropriate. On the other hand
however, the assumption that εt is white noise is inconsistent with the implication
of Lemma 2 that the forecast errors grow without bound and it seems reasonable
to assume that this will lead agents to use a different estimation procedure.
3 An alternative learning procedure
In the previous section it was argued that the nonstationary nature of the price
time series may lead to endogenous and persisting fluctuations in inflation rates.
According to the perceived law of motion (5) agents believe that the systematic
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part of the inflation rate is constant. We can rewrite (5) into the following perceived
law of motion
πt = β. (14)
Notice that the economic agents’ perceptions underlying both (5) and (14) is that
the inflation rate is constant.5
Now suppose agents try to learn the correct value of β in (14) by running a least
squares regression of inflation rates on a constant, which corresponds to averaging







βt + 1t πt−1. The
evolution of inflation rates and dynamics is threfore described by









This updating rule is closely related to (8) and (11), the main difference lying in the
fact that the weight factor 1/t approaches 0 as t goes to infinity. Hence, the contri-
bution of new observations will decrease over time and the stability properties of
(15) turn out to be dramatically different from the stability properties of (8). In an
earlier version of the current paper (Tuinstra and Wagener 2000) we showed that
the monetary steady state ϑ is globally stable under (15) for a large set of savings
functions (including those studied in Bullard 1994; Scho¨nhofer 1999).6
In the present version of this paper we consider a slightly different algorithm.







· · · p1
p0
= ∏t−1s=0 πs.The average inflation rate over this






is what our agents use as a predictor for the future inflation rate βt+1. Notice that
this can be written recursively as




ln πs = ln βt + 1
t
(ln πt−1 − ln βt) , (16)
which corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the logarithm of the inflation rate.
Now define xt = ln βt − ln ϑ , and σ (xt ) = ln S (ϑ exp [xt ]). Using (7), (16)
can be written as the following nonautonomous second order difference equation
xt+1 = xt + 1
t
(σ (xt−1) − σ(xt ) − xt ) . (17)
5 From an econometric point of view there is a distinction between the perceived laws of
motions (5) and (14) however, depending upon how shocks are perceived to enter the system; as
pt = βpt−1 + εt , or as πt = β + εt (or as ln πt = ln β + εt for the system analyzed later in this
section). From an econometric perspective it is, a priori, unclear which of these perceived laws of
motion is the most appropriate. Note that all of these perceived laws of motions are misspecified,
since the underlying actual law of motion (7) is a more complicated function of inflation rates
and beliefs.
6 Also Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p. 358), when discussing the results of Bullard (1994),
suggest that it is more natural to assume that β is estimated by the mean of past inflation rates.
Moreover, they also claim that the steady state is always stable under this learning rule.
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The remainder of this section is devoted to analyzing the stability properties of
(17).
Recall that a function σ : IR → IR is locally Lipschitz continuous, if it satisfies
a Lipschitz condition on any bounded interval. In this section we show that the
steady state x = 0 of the dynamic system (17) is locally stable for any locally
Lipschitz continuous function σ , and that x = 0 is globally stable for any function
satisfying a Lipschitz condition on IR.
The first property of our system is that, if a sufficiently long initial segment of
the sequence {xt } is bounded then the whole sequence is bounded.
Proposition 3 Let K > 2 be an arbitrary positive constant, and assume that
σ : [−K,K] → IR is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant L. Let the
sequence {xt }∞t=1 satisfy the recurrence relation (17). If for 1 ≤ t ≤ 10L + 1 the
condition
|xt | < 310K (18)
holds, then for all t ≥ 1 we have |xt | < K .
Proof Introduce the increments δt+1 = xt+1 − xt , and note that rewriting the
recurrence equation (17) in terms of the increments gives
δt+1 = 1
t
(σ (xt − δt ) − σ(xt ) − xt ) . (19)
The idea of the proof: if all xt were, for instance, larger than zero, then using




For large t , the factor L/t will be smaller than unity. Inequality (20) then implies
that the sequence xt is bounded from above. However, care is needed to treat the
case that the xt change sign, and to deal with the fact that (20) only gives an upper
bound.
Set T = 10L+ 1. Note that |δt+1| ≤ |xt+1| + |xt | ≤ 35K for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1
by assumption. Moreover, as a consequence of (20) and the choice of T , the δt+1
have the property that whenever xt > 0 for t ≥ T , then δt+1 ≤ 110 |δt |. We claim
that this estimate implies xt < xT−1 + 23K < K for all t . Note generally that
xt − xT−1 =
∑t−T
j=0 δT+j .
1. First consider the case that xt > 0 for all t ≥ T . Let T ≤ s ≤ t − 1 be
such that δs ≤ 0 and that δs+j > 0, for j = 1, . . . , n. Since
∑n
j=1 δs+j ≤∑n
j=1 10−j |δs | < −δs , it follows that
∑n
j=0 δs+j < 0. Hence, the sum∑t−T
j=0 δT+j is bounded from above by the contribution of the first l terms,
where l is such that δT+j ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ j ≤ l and δT+l+1 < 0. Since |δT | < 35K ,







) = 23K and







502 J. Tuinstra and F.O.O. Wagener
2. In the case of a sign change of xt , we argue by induction. It is assumed
that |xj | < K for 1 ≤ j ≤ t , and that xt < 0 and xt+j ≥ 0 for some
t and j = 1, . . . , n. Then, by (19), xt < |δt+1| ≤ Lt |xt − xt−1| + |xt |t ≤
L
10L+1 2K + K10L+1 < 310K . Hence xt+1 < 310K , and by the same argument as
in 1. it follows that
∑
δt+j < 23K and consequently that xt+j < K for all
j = 1, . . . , n.
The proof that xt > −K for all t ≥ T is completely analogous. unionsq
As a consequence we have
Corollary 4 Let σ : IR → IR be (globally) Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz
constant L. If the sequence {xt } satisfies (17), then it is bounded.
Proof In view of Proposition 3, all we have to know is that max1≤t≤10L+1 |xt | < ∞.
But this follows from the Lipschitz condition. unionsq
In order to get some idea what types of savings functions are covered by Proposi-
tion 3 let ξ = ϑ exp [x] andφ = ϑ exp [y]. The condition thatσ(x) satisfies a global













. In particular, for φ = 1 this condition reads as S(1)ξ−L < S(ξ) < S(1)ξL.
The first inequality says that S should not decrease faster than polynomially in ξ−1
as ξ → ∞.
That the condition is quite sharp can be seen by considering σ(x) = −x − x2.
The corresponding savings function reads as S(ξ) = (ξ/ϑ)−(ln ξ+c), where c =
1 − ln ϑ . Note that here the exponent of ξ−1 grows beyond all bounds. For this
choice of σ , the unbounded series xt = t is one of the solutions of (17). However,
also for this savings function the trajectories under (17) remain bounded for a large
set of initial conditions.
Bounded sequences have the following attractive property.
Proposition 5 Let σ : IR → IR be continuous. Any bounded orbit {xt } of (17)
converges to 0.
Proof Recall that 0 corresponds to the monetary steady state in the original vari-
ables. Introduce, as before, the increment δt+1 = xt+1 −xt , and let K > 0 be such
that |xt | < K for all t ≥ 1. Note that it follows from (19) that |δt | < Mt for some
M > 0.
We shall show that for arbitrary ε > 0, any point will move to the interval
[−2ε, 2ε], and that the points in this interval cannot escape too far if t is suffi-
ciently large.
Fix ε > 0. Note that σ is uniformly continuous on [−K,K] , and hence that
there exists an δ > 0 such that if |δt | < δ, then |σ(xt − δt ) − σ(xt )| < ε. Choose
T > 0 larger than M/ε and M/δ. Then for all t > T , we have that |δt | < ε and,
from (19), that
δt+1 ≤ ε − xt
t
. (21)
Let t0 > T . We ask whether it is possible that xt ∈ [−2ε, 2ε] for all t ≥ t0. Since
|δt+1| < ε, points cannot move from positive to negative without going through
On learning equilibria 503
[−2ε, 2ε], and we may restrict our attention to the case that the xt are positive (the
other case would be treated similarly).
From (21) and xt > 2ε, the following estimate is obtained: xt = xt0 +∑t−1





. Since the harmonic series
∑
s−1 diverges, the right
hand side cannot be larger than 2ε for all t , and hence there must be a first mo-
ment in time t1 such that xt1 ∈ [−2ε, 2ε]. But note that then for t > t1, the state
xt cannot escape the interval [−3ε, 3ε] any more: if |xt−1| < 2ε < |xt |, then
|xt | < |xt−1| + |δt | < 2ε + ε , and the next iterates move the state back to the
interval [−2ε, 2ε], as can be seen by noting that from (21) we have δt+1 < 0 for
xt > ε. Similarly we have, from (19), δt+1 > 0 for xt < −ε.
Finally, we remark that if σ is of the form ln S(ϑ exp [x]), with S a positive
savings function, then σ has the special property that limx→−∞ σ(x) = ln S(0).
From this we obtain that an orbit {xt } of (17) will be bounded from below. To
see this, fix ε > 0, and find K > 0 such that |σ(x) − ln S(0)| < ε if x <
−K . Then for xt < −K we have that xt+1 ≥ xt − xt+2εt ≥ xt + K−2εt ≥ xt ,
while for |xt | ≤ K we have that xt+1 ≥ xt − 2C+Kt ≥ −2C − 2K , where C =
max|x|≤K σ(x). Hence xt ≥ min(x1,−2C−2K), and these orbits cannot run off to
infinity. unionsq
From these results we may conclude that our dynamic system converges to the
monetary steady state ϑ for a large set of savings functions (including those from
Bullard 1994; Scho¨nhofer 1999). If the inflation dynamics do not converge to this
equilibrium inflation rates diverge to infinity (which corresponds to autarky). This
only happens if savings decline very fast as the (expected) inflation rate increases.
Duffy (1994) studies an overlapping generations model where this autarkic steady
state is also stable under learning.
4 Competition between learning procedures
As shown above, the procedure that agents use to estimate a perceived law of motion
is pivotal for the stability properties of the full economic system. Moreover, the
endogenous business cycles studied by Bullard (1994) and Scho¨nhofer (1999) do
not result from the perceptions of the agents per se, but from the way in which these
perceptions are updated as new information becomes available. From Propositions
3 and 5 we know that these endogenous business cycles disappear when agents use
inflation rates, instead of price levels, to update their perceptions.
However, the fact that an estimation procedure is destabilizing does not nec-
essarily imply that economic agents will not use it. It is therefore important to
investigate what happens when both procedures are available to the agents, a prob-
lem which we take up in this section. We assume that each newborn agent chooses
an estimation procedure on the basis of its past performance. In fact, the lower the
average quadratic forecast error of the predictions generated by a certain procedure,
the higher the fraction of the newborn generation that will choose this procedure.
Our objective is to study whether, in this evolutionary competition between estima-
tion procedures, the “unstable” procedure will be driven out. A priori, this does not
have to be the case, since the presence of this procedure may disrupt the inflation
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dynamics to such an extent that the other estimation procedure will perform even
worse.7
We follow the framework developed in Brock and Hommes (1997) for analyz-
ing evolutionary competition between estimation procedures. There are two types
of agents, those using prices to estimate future inflation rates (index 1), as dis-
cussed in Section 2, and those using past inflation rates (index 2), as discussed
in Section 3. The fraction of agents of type 1 of the generation born in period t










. Using the money growth rule (3),









ntS (β1t ) + (1 − nt ) S (β2t ) , (22)
where β1t = pe1,t+1/pt and β2t = pe2,t+1/pt , are the expected inflation rates of
type 1 and type 2 agents, respectively, which evolve according to [cf. equations (6)
and (16)]
















First consider the case where the fraction nt is fixed and exogenously given. The
proof of the following result, together with that of Proposition 7, is based upon a
generalization of a result from Evans and Honkapohja (2000), which can be found
in the appendix of this paper.
Lemma 6 Consider the model given by (22) and (23), where the distribution of
agents over learning procedures is fixed, i.e. nt = n for all t . Assume furthermore
that the savings function is positive but monotonically decreasing in the inflation
rate and that a′ (ϑ) > 0. The monetary steady state ϑ then is locally stable if
n
(
1 − ϑ−2) a (ϑ) < 1. (24)
Proof First we linearize the system [i.e. equations (22) and (23)] around the steady
state and then apply Proposition 9 from the appendix, where ξt = β˜2t and xt =(
β˜1t , β˜1,t−1, g˜t
)
are the linearized variables. Since, in the terminology of Proposi-
tion 9, A = 0 and C = 0 [see equations (37), (38)] local stability is determined by
the eigenvalues of the matrix D, which in fact is the Jacobian matrix of the time
invariant dynamical system
βt+1 = βt + gt
[
ϑ
nS (γt ) + (1 − n) S (ϑ)









nS (γt ) + (1 − n) S (ϑ)





7 This would be similar to the theoretical finding that on financial markets so-called “noise
traders” cannot always be driven out by rational investors (see De Long, Shleifer, Summers and
Waldmann 1990).
On learning equilibria 505


















whereD1 is the 2×2 upper left submatrix ofD. The eigenvalues ofD areμ3 = ϑ−2
and those of D1. The determinant of D1 is n
(
1 − ϑ−2) a (ϑ) which, under condi-
tion (24), is smaller than 1. Moreover, condition (24) together with ϑ > 1 implies
that the trace of D1, which equals ϑ−2 + n
(
1 − ϑ−2) a (ϑ), lies between 0 and
2. The eigenvalues of D1 are given by μ1,2 = 12Trace ± 12
√
(Trace)2 − 4Det. If
the eigenvalues are complex then their absolute value is equal to the determinant
which is smaller than one. Therefore the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle for
that case. If the eigenvalues are real they have to be positive since the trace (which
is equal to μ1 + μ2) and the determinant (which is equal to μ1 × μ2) are both
positive. As can be easily verified the largest eigenvalue is larger than one if and
only if Trace > 1 + Det. However, since Trace = ϑ−2 + Det and ϑ > 1 this
is impossible. Therefore, under condition (24) all eigenvalues of D lie in the unit
circle and it follows from Proposition 9 that the steady state of the model (22) and
(23), with nt = n, is locally stable. unionsq
Clearly, a decrease in the fraction n of type 1 agents generates local stability of
the monetary steady state for a larger set of savings functions and money growth
rates ϑ .
Now we will endogenize nt by assuming that the households from a newborn
generation base their choice for the estimation procedure upon the past performance
of these procedures. The appropriate performance measure is the average quadratic
forecast error, since this is what agents are actually trying to minimize with their
least squares algorithms.8 The (negative of the) average quadratic forecast error
for learning procedure i is given as




)2 + t − 2
t − 1wit , i = 1, 2. (26)
The relationship between w1,t+1, w2,t+1 and the fraction nt+1 is modelled as fol-
lows. We assume that each household i of the newborn generation can be identified
by a parameter εi , which is distributed according to a distribution F , with mean 0.
This parameter εi measures household i’s preference for (or bias towards) estima-
tion procedure 2. This household then chooses rule 1 if and only if the performance
of rule 1 is significantly higher than that of rule 2 , that is, if w1,t+1 −w2,t+1 ≥ 1η εi ,
where η is a measure of the dispersion of the bias, in the sense that as η increases
the bias toward rule 2 is distributed more tightly around 0. Moreover, as η goes
to +∞, all households always choose the estimation procedure with the lowest
average quadratic forecast error. Assuming that there are many households in each
8 Alternatively, we could let the choice of estimator depend upon the realized utility from the
savings decision. This leads to qualitatively the same results.
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generation and εi is drawn from the logistic distribution we obtain
nt+1 = 11 + exp [η (w2,t+1 − w1,t+1
)] , (27)
but other choices give qualitatively the same results. The parameter η is sometimes
called the intensity of choice and can be interpreted as a measure of how sensitive
agents’ choice of estimation procedure is with respect to differences in forecasting
accuracy. In fact, as η goes to infinity all households of the current generation will
choose the estimation procedure with the best forecasting accuracy in the past.
The parameter η therefore measures the level of “rationality” in the choice of esti-
mation procedure. Furthermore, if estimation procedures perform equally well,
agents will be distributed evenly over the estimation procedures, i.e. nt = 12 . Note
the timing of the process. When a new generation is born in period t + 1 the last
price it observes is pt and the last inflation rate it observes is πt−1. The fraction
nt+1 is determined by quadratic forecast errors, and the last observed forecast error
therefore corresponds to βi,t−1 − πt−1.
Combining (26) and (27) gives















with αt = 1t . The full evolutionary model is now given by equations (22), (23) and
(28). The steady state of the full model is (β∗1 , g∗, β∗2 , n∗
) = (ϑ, 1 − ϑ−2, ϑ, 12
)
.
Applying Proposition 9 from the appendix again we find the following.
Proposition 7 Consider the evolutionary model given by equations (22), (23) and
(28). Let the savings function S be positive and monotonically decreasing in the
inflation rate. Then the monetary steady state is locally stable if
(
1 − ϑ−2) a (ϑ) < 2. (29)





β˜1t , β˜1,t−1, g˜t
)
. Since the matrices A and C both are equal to 0
local stability of the system given by (22), (23) and (28) is determined again by the
eigenvalues of the matrix D from (25) with n = 12 . Applying the reasoning of the
proof of Lemma 6 we find that all eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle and then,
by Proposition 9 the steady state of (22), (23) and (28) is stable. unionsq
Note the relation with condition (9) from Proposition 1 which characterises
local stability in the case that only the type 1 estimation procedure is available. The
interpretation underlying Proposition 7 is the following: if inflation rates converge
to the monetary steady state, both types of forecasts will be correct and the fraction
nt will converge to 12 . However, if the monetary steady state is unstable when n
is fixed at 12 (apply Lemma 6 for n = 12 ) the autonomous dynamic system will be
locally unstable at the monetary steady state ϑ . Also note that, although instability
On learning equilibria 507



















Fig. 1 Attractor for the evolutionary model with ϑ = 52 , η = 3 and CES utility function with
ρ = 34
of the steady state is still possible under evolutionary competition between the esti-
mation procedures, this instability occurs only under a subset of savings functions
and money growth rates for which instability arises in the original model. The
introduction of type 2 agents therefore indeed tends to stabilize the inflation and
learning dynamics. This is similar to the result by Branch (2002) who finds that
adding a third predictor, corresponding to adaptive expectations, to the Brock and
Hommes (1997) model of evolutionary competition between rational and naive
predictors in a cobweb model, may stabilize the system.
Let us consider a typical numerical simulation to illustrate the global dynamics
of the model when condition (29) does not hold. We use an example from Bullard
(1994), where the savings function is derived from the well-known CES utility






with endowments w0 = 1 and w1 = 0 and
1
2 < ρ < 1. Taking ρ = 34 , the savings function and inflation elasticity follow as
S (π) = (1 + π3)−1 and a (π) = 3 (1 + π−3)−1. From Proposition 1 we find that,
if all agents are of type 1 (i.e. nt = 1 for all t), the monetary steady state is locally
stable for ϑ < 12 + 12
√
3 ≈ 1.366. On the other hand, if nt is determined by past
performance, as in (28), the steady state is locally stable for ϑ < 2, as can be seen
from applying Proposition 7. Simulation results for the case with ϑ = 52 and η = 3
are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
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Fig. 2 Time series for the evolutionary model with ϑ = 52 , η = 3 and with CES utility function
with ρ = 34
The attractor in Figure 1 shows the long run behavior of the inflation rates for
ϑ = 52 and η = 3. Inflation rates move quasi-periodically over an invariant closed
curve. Figure 2 shows the time series for the forecasts β1t and β2t and the frac-
tion nt . These time series provide a nice illustration of the mechanism underlying
the global dynamics. When inflation rates are far away from the monetary steady
state, as in the first ten periods, predictor β2 is much more accurate than β1. This
decreases nt as can be seen in the lower panel of Figure 2. The decreased fraction
of type 1 agents stabilizes the inflationary dynamics. However, as inflation rates
converge to the monetary steady state, there is no evolutionary pressure against
β1 and the fraction of type 1 agents will increase again, until nt has taken a value
such that the inflation rates become unstable (it follows from Lemma 6 that for
ϑ = 52 the critical value of n is given by nc = 1945 ≈ 0.4222) and the story repeats.
Eventually the fraction nt converges to n̂ ≈ 0.4248. At this value of n the inflation
rates and the forecasts of learning procedure 1 move over an invariant closed curve.
Note that the fraction nt converges because it is determined by the average forecast
errors which converge as long as they are bounded.
Qualitatively similar results are obtained for simulations with different sav-
ings functions, parameter settings and \ or initial conditions, although the transient
behavior might be a little different.9 In all these examples nt converges to a value
below 12 .
9 Depending on the parameter values and the initial conditions, the transient behavior of the
system might be quite long (this happens for example for high values of η).
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5 Concluding remarks
Departing from the theory of rational expectations introduces infinitely many de-
grees of freedom in modelling agents’ beliefs. This “wilderness of bounded ratio-
nality” can be restricted by considering agents that, if not unboundedly rational, at
least are trying to be “sensible” in predicting the future development of economic
variables. That is, they should have a perceived law of motion that is reasonable,
in some sense, and they should use the appropriate econometric techniques to esti-
mate this perceived law of motion. The learning equilibria obtained by Bullard
(1994) and Scho¨nhofer (1999), are due to applying a least squares regression to a
nonstationary price time series. In this paper we have shown that a different and
perhaps more reasonable estimation technique (estimating the perceived law of
motion on the basis of the stationary time series of inflation rates) induces conver-
gence to the monetary steady state. Recall that the perceived laws of motion and
therefore agents’ beliefs are the same for both models. Therefore, these learning
equilibria are not the result of modelling agents as econometricians per se, but
they are the result of the specific way in which these econometricians run their
regressions.
Another approach to discipline the “wilderness of bounded rationality” is to
consider an evolutionary competition between the different types of beliefs, and
then let this competition decide which beliefs will eventually survive. Apply-
ing such an evolutionary competition to the two estimation procedures discussed
in this paper shows that none of the estimation procedures will be driven out.
This result can be explained by observing that at the steady state both learn-
ing procedures generate the same forecasts, and their performance will there-
fore be the same. At this steady state, therefore, there is no evolutionary pressure
against the rule using a nonstationary time series, but its presence may neverthe-
less destabilize the inflation rate dynamics and cause endogenous business cycles to
emerge.
In this paper we have therefore identified a new route to endogenous fluc-
tuations in overlapping generations models. First we argued that in a homoge-
neous world, where all agents use the same estimation procedure, it does not
seem to be reasonable to assume that they all use a procedure which uses non-
stationary data, leads to exploding forecast errors and generates inconsistent and
nonconverging estimators. Second, in a heterogeneous world, where some agents
might use such a procedure whereas others do not, an evolutionary competition
between the different rules might, in a very natural way, lead to endogenous
fluctuations.
The goal of this paper has not been to provide a counter-example to possible
instability of learning models (Wenzelburger 2002, for example, discusses for the
same overlapping generations framework another learning process with nice sta-
bility properties). In fact, we saw in section 4 that learning processes may lead
to endogenous business cycles. However, the underlying mechanism driving these
business cycles is different from that in the original model of Bullard (1994) and
certainly more robust. Other examples of learning models that might lead to endog-
enous fluctuations are, for example, provided by Hommes and Sorger (1998) and
Tuinstra (2003). In these models the perceived law of motion of the agents con-
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verges to some limit belief and given this limit belief prices keep fluctuating over
some nontrivial attractor.
Appendix A: Local asymptotic stability of the evolutionary model
To show the local asymptotic stability of the evolutionary model defined by equa-
tions (22), (23) and (27), we have to generalize a result from Evans and Honkapohja
(2000). They consider an iterative scheme of the form
xt = xt−1 + αt (F (xt−1, αt ) − xt−1) , (30)
with xt ∈ IRm, αt ∈ IR and the function F continuously differentiable in a neigh-
borhood of (x, α) = (0, 0), F (0, α) = 0 and F continuous in a neighborhood of
(0, α) for every α ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, they assume that 0 < αt < 1, limt→∞ αt = 0
and
∑∞
t=1 αt = ∞.
These assumptions imply that x = 0 is a fixed point of the scheme.
Theorem 8 (Evans and Honkapohja 2000, Proposition 1, p. 719) If all the eigen-
values of the matrix DxF (0, 0) have real part smaller than one, the fixed point
x = 0 of (30) is locally asymptotically stable; that is, there is a neighborhood U
of x = 0, such that for all x0 ∈ U , the sequence {xt } generated by (30) converges
to 0.
However, the form of the evolutionary model given by (22), (23) and (28) is
more complicated than the Evans–Honkapohja iterative scheme (30). This can be
seen most readily by introducing linearizing variables
βj,s = ϑ + β˜j,s , gt =
(
1 − ϑ−2)+ g˜t , nt = 12 + n˜t .
Expanding the evolutionary model around the steady state then yields








β˜1,t−1 + β˜2,t−1 − β˜1,t − β˜2,t
)− β˜1,t
]
+ · · · , (31)






β˜1,t−1 + β˜2,t−1 − β˜1,t − β˜2,t
)− β˜2,t
]
+ · · · , (32)
g˜t+1 = −ϑ−3
(
1 − ϑ−2) a (ϑ) (β˜1,t−1 + β˜2,t−1 − β˜1,t − β˜2,t






n˜t + · · · , (34)
where the dots indicate terms of higher than first order. This is a non-autonomous
dynamical system in the state variables
(
β˜1,t , β˜1,t−1, β˜2,t , β˜2,t−1, g˜t , n˜t , n˜t−1
)
. Note
that the right hand sides of these equations are roughly of the form of the Evans–
Honkapohja iterative scheme, but the gains parameter 1 − ϑ−2 of equation (31)
is constant, and both right hand sides depend not only on β˜1,t and β˜2,t , but also
on earlier time lags of these variables. These two points prevent us from applying
Theorem 8 directly. However, by modifying the ideas behind Theorem 8, we obtain
a result that can be applied to the evolutionary system given above. This result will
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be derived in the remainder of this appendix. Consider, to that end, a system of the
form
ξt = ξt−1 + αt (f (ξt−1, . . . , ξt−k, xt , αt ) − ξt−1) , (35)
xt = g (ξt−1, . . . , ξt−k, xt−1) , (36)
where ξt ∈ IRn, xt ∈ IRm, and where αt satisfies the conditions given at the
beginning of this section. It is assumed that f (0, . . . , 0, 0, 0) = 0 and that
g (0, . . . , 0, 0) = 0; moreover the functions f and g are assumed to be con-
tinuously differentiable. Note that the system (31)–(34) is indeed of the form (35)
and (36). To see this observe that we can write (34) as

















β˜1,t , β˜1,t−1, g˜t
) ∈ IR3 and αt = 1t .
Recall “small-o” and “big-O” notation:φ (x)=o (ψ (x)) andφ (x)= O (ψ (x))
as x → 0 indicate respectively that |φ (x)| / |ψ (x)| → 0 and |φ (x)| < C |ψ (x)|
as x → 0; we shall write o (x, y) short for o ((x, y)). We set ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξk) and
introduce matrices Aj , Cj , B, D by
f (ξ, x, α) = A1ξ1 + · · · + Akξk + Bx + o (ξ, x) + O (α)O (ξ, x) , (37)
g (ξ, x) = C1ξ1 + · · · + Ckξk + Dx + o (ξ, x) ; (38)
we introduce moreover A = ∑j Aj and C =
∑
j Cj .
Recall that by a linear coordinate transformation, any matrix A can be put into
Jordan normal form; that is, there is a block diagonal matrix J = diag (J1, . . . , JL)
and an invertible matrix U such that A = U−1JU . The coordinate transformation
can be chosen in such a way that for a given δ > 0, the block matrices Jl are all of





nij = 1 if j = i+1 and 0 otherwise. It can be shown that the choices involving the
transformations U can be fully specified; then the U are functions of the matrix A.
If λ∗ = maxl |λl| + δ, then |Jy| ≤ λ∗ |y|, where |·| denotes the Euclidean norm.
Recall also that to any vector norm ‖·‖ there is associated a matrix norm, also
denoted ‖·‖, by setting ‖A‖ = max‖x‖=1 ‖Ax‖. More generally, if A is a linear map
between spaces with different norms, say A : (IRm, ‖·‖1) → (IRn, ‖·‖2), then the
matrix norm ‖A‖1,2 = max‖x‖1=1 ‖Ax‖2 is induced. Define the norm ‖x‖A ≡ |Ux|
if A = U−1JU . The virtue of the norm ‖x‖A is the inequality
‖Ax‖A =
∣∣UU−1JUx∣∣ = |JUx| ≤ λ∗ |Ux| = λ∗ ‖x‖A .
Proposition 9 Assume that all eigenvalues of A have real part strictly smaller
than a < 1 and all eigenvalues of D are strictly smaller than d < 1 in absolute
value; moreover, assume that
(1 − a) (1 − d) − ‖B‖D,A ‖C‖A,D > 0.
Then the equilibrium (ξ, x) = (0, 0) of (35) and (36) is locally asymptotically
stable.
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Theorem 8 is a special case of this result, which is obtained by adding an equa-
tion of the form xt = 0 to equation (30); this yields D = 0, C = 0. Note moreover
that if the theorem is applied to the system given by equations (31)–(34) then the
matrices A and C in equations (37) and (38) satisfy A = 0, C = 0. The condition
of Proposition 9 is then satisfied if the eigenvalues of the matrix D in (38) are less
than 1 in absolute value, as has been verified in the proof of Proposition 7.
Proof Letαt = sups≥t {αs}. Note that {αt } is a nonincreasing sequence andαt → 0
as t → ∞ . Using (35) and substituting ξt−1 for ξt−2 up to ξt−k we obtain
f (ξt−1, . . . , ξt−k, xt−1, αt ) = Aξt−1 + Bxt−1 + o (ξt−1, . . . , ξt−k, xt−1)
+O (αt−k+1)O (ξt−1, . . . , ξt−k, xt−1) (39)
g (ξt−1, . . . , ξt−k, xt−1) = Cξt−1 + Dxt−1
+o (ξt−1, . . . , ξt−k, xt−1) . (40)
We claim that the local stability of the system (35) and (36) is governed by the
terms f and g that are linear in ξ and x.
The proof uses induction on t . In order to formulate the induction hypoth-
esis, vector norms and matrix norms have to be specified. Choose therefore a∗
and d∗ such that a < a∗ < 1, 0 < d < d∗ < 1, and (1 − a∗) (1 − d∗) −
‖B‖D,A ‖C‖A,D > 0; this is possible by hypothesis. Let the matrix norms ‖·‖A
and ‖·‖D be such that
‖I + α (A − I )‖A ≤ 1 + α (a − 1) , ‖D‖D ≤ d,
for all α > 0 sufficiently small. Also, choose b∗, c∗ > 0 such that ‖B‖D,A <
b∗, ‖C‖A,D < c∗ and
(
1 − a∗) (1 − d∗)− b∗c∗ > 0. (41)
Note that the conditions a∗ + γ−1b∗ < 1 and γ c∗ + d∗ < 1 can only be satis-




. Equation (41) ensures that the open interval on the
right hand side is not empty. Choose γ to be the middle of this interval. Introduce
δ = max {a∗ + γ−1b∗, γ c∗ + d∗} and note that 0 < δ < 1 by construction.
Given η0 > 0 define the sequence {ηt } as follows. Since αt → 0, there exists
a t0 > 0 such that αt < (a∗ − a) /2 if t ≥ t0. Set
ηt =
{
cηt−1 if t ≤ t0,
(1 − δαt ) ηt−1 if t > t0.
As induction hypothesis, it is assumed that
‖ξs‖A , γ ‖xs‖D ≤ ηs, 0 ≤ s < t.
Choose ε such that ε < (a∗ − a) /2 and ε < d∗−d. From the induction hypothesis









γ c∗ + d + ε) ηt−1,
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where κ is a positive constant. Taking c = 2+κ+‖A‖A+γ ‖B‖D,A, it follows that
the induction hypothesis is satisfied for t ≤ t0. For t > t0, the following stronger
inequalities hold true
‖ξt‖A ≤ ηt−1 − αt
(
1 − a − γ−1b∗ − ε − καt−k+1
)
ηt−1,
≤ ηt−1 − αt
(
1 − a∗ − γ−1b∗) ηt−1,
γ ‖xt‖D ≤ ηt−1 − αt
(
1 − γ c∗ − d∗) ηt−1.
We obtain
‖ξt‖A , γ ‖xt‖D ≤ (1 − δαt ) ηt−1.
It is clear that the induction hypothesis is satisfied for all remaining values of t .




(1 − δαs) < ct0η0e−δ
∑t
s=t0+1 αs ;
the last expression tends to 0 as t → ∞ since ∑∞t=0 αt = ∞. unionsq
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